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Introduction: Natural Law and the Theory of Practical Rationality 1

0.1 Natural Law Theory an Account of Practical Rationality 1

0.2 The Ways in Which This Work Is Incomplete 3

1 The Real Identity Thesis 6

1.1 Rival Views of How Goods Are Known 6

Inclinationist and Derivationist Accounts of Fundamental Practical Knowledge 6

Difficulties with Derivationism and Inclinationism 13

The Real Identity Thesis Stated 17

1.2 Functioning and Flourishing 21

That the Human Has a Function: The Functional-Composition Thesis 23

An Analysis of ‘Function’ 26

That the Human’s Functioning Is to Be Identified with Its Flourishing 29

A Superfluous Concept? 32

1.3 Knowledge of Human Flourishing 34

Mentalism 34

Statistical Normalcy 35

Knowledge of Flourishing as Implicit in Particular Function Judgments 36

1.4 The Real Identity Thesis 40

Reasons to Affirm the Real Identity Thesis 40

Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory and the Real Identity Thesis 43

2 Well-Being 46

2.1 Natural Law Theory as Welfarist and Objectivist 46

2.2 The Refutation of Conceptual Subjectivism 48

2.3 The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory as the Best Version of Strong Subjectivism 50

Against the Simple View: That Desires Can Be Based on False Beliefs 53

Against the Simple View: That Desires Can Be Absent due to a Lack of True Beliefs 62

Against the Simple View: That Second-Order Desires Must Be Taken into Account 64

Against the Simple View: That It Is Unable to Capture the Critical Character of the Good 67

2.4 The Refutation of Strong Subjectivism 71

How Desires Entail Reasons 72

A Question Left Open 76

2.5 The Refutation of Weak Subjectivism 76

The Subject-Relativity of Well-Being 76

Internalist Constraints 80

Troubles with Substantive Theories of Rationality 90

A Question Left Open 92

2.6 ‘Objective List’ Theories 94

3 The Reasons That Make Action Intelligible 96

3.1 The List of Goods 96

3.2 Pleasure and Pain 96

3.3 The Basic Goods 100

Life 101

Knowledge 106

Aesthetic Experience 109

Excellence in Play and Work 111

Excellence in Agency 114

Inner Peace 118

Friendship and Community 126

Religion 131

Happiness 133

3.4 Inner Peace, Happiness, and the Hybrid View of the Nature of Well-Being 135

3.5 The Real Identity Thesis Revisited 137

4 Welfarism and Its Discontents 139

4.1 Welfarism in the Theory of Practical Rationality 139

4.2 Welfarism Does Not Imply Egoism 140

4.3 Welfarism Does Not Imply a Maximizing Theory of Rationality 142

4.4 Welfarism Does Not Imply Promotionism 147

5 The Principles That Make Choice Reasonable 157

5.1 A Justificatory Framework for Principles of Practical Reasonableness 157

Plans of Action and Principles of Practical Reasonableness 157

The Formulation and Defense of Principles of Practical Reasonableness 160

5.2 Egoism, Consequentialism, Kantianism 162

Egoism 162

Consequentialism 167

Kantianism 169

5.3 The Nature of Reasons for Action 172

Welfarism about the Good 172

Agent-Relativity and Agent-Neutrality 174

Incommensurability 182

Producible Ends and Ends-in-Themselves 187

5.4 A Note on Hierarchy among the Basic Goods 190

5.5 Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Plans of Action 198

Against Dismissing or Devaluing Aspects of Well-Being 198

Against Dismissing or Devaluing Persons within the Context of Agent-Neutral Ends 201

Against Intentional, Instrumental Destruction of Instances of Basic Good 204

Against Inefficiency 207

5.6 Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Agents 208

Against Over- and Under-Specificity in Planning 209

Against Flightiness and Stubbornness 210

Against Idleness 212

5.7 Virtue Theory 212

Virtue and the Correctness of Practical Judgment 213

Virtues, Principles, and Motivation 217

6 What Ought to Be Done 220

6.1 ‘Ought’ 220

6.2 The Moral ‘Ought’ 222

6.3 How Practical Reason Can Err 228

Against Discrimination 230

Against Lying 234

Against Callousness 238

6.4 Moral Dilemmas 240

6.5 Positive Norms, Life Plans, and the Partial Constitution Thesis 246

6.6 Normative Openness and Natural Law Theories of Authority 252

Notes 255

Works Cited 271

Index 279