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1. Introduction 1

1.1. Introduction 1

1.2. Subject matter 2

1.3. Methodology 3

1.3.A. Methodology and concepts used in the economic analysis of law 4

1.3.B. Methodology and concepts used in comparative contract law 7

1.3.C. Steps of comparative enquiry 9

1.3.D. Methodology and concepts used in comparative contract law and economics 11

1.4. Outline of the book 13

2. Pre-contractual Duty to Disclose Information 15

2.1. Introduction 15

2.2. Prior literature 17

2.3. Optimal model rule 24

2.3.A. Preliminaries: Information-some conceptual distinctions 26

2.3.B. Preliminaries: Mistake or duty of disclosure 27

2.3.C. Optimal model rule: Fundamental principle 30

2.3.C.Ⅰ. Optimal amount of information 34

2.3.D. Upgraded model rule: Utilization, productive and redistributive information 35

2.3.D.I. Deliberately acquired productive or redistributive information 37

2.3.D.Ⅱ. Deliberately acquired pure redistributive information 39

2.3.D.Ⅲ. Casually acquired productive or redistributive information 39

2.3.D.Ⅳ. Casually acquired purely redistributive information 43

2.3.D.Ⅴ. Simultaneously productive/redistributive information 43

2.3.D.Ⅵ. Administering and enforcement costs 45

2.3.D.Ⅶ. Right to lie 47

2.3.E. Synthesis: Towards an optimal doctrine 49

2.4. French law: Duty to inform （reticence dolosive） 52

2.4.A. General overview 52

2.4.B. Assessment of current doctrine 57

2.4.C. Assessment of the law in action 61

2.4.D. Conclusions on French law 69

2.5. English law 70

2.5.A. General overview 71

2.5.B. Assessment of current doctrine 75

2.5.C. Assessment of the law in action 76

2.5.C.Ⅰ. Further exemptions 86

2.5.D. Conclusions on English law 87

2.6. American law 87

2.6.A. General overview 88

2.6.B. Assessment of current doctrine 93

2.6.C. Assessment of the law in action 95

2.6.C.Ⅰ. Further exemptions 101

2.6.D. Conclusions on American law 102

2.7. German law: Duties to inform （aufklarungspflichten） 102

2.7.A. General overview 103

2.7.B. Assessment of current doctrine 107

2.7.C. Assessment of the law in action 110

2.7.D. Conclusions on German law 116

2.8. Conclusion 117

3. Unforeseen Contingencies 118

3.1. Introduction 118

3.2. Prior literature 121

3.3. Foreseeability 127

3.3.A. Analysis applied 135

3.3.B. Synthesis and implications 137

3.4. Optimal model rule 139

3.4.A. Preliminaries 139

3.4.B. Optimal model rule 142

3.4.B.Ⅰ. Onerous performance-slight rise in cost of performance-no excuse 143

3.4.B.Ⅱ. Excessively onerous performance-performance ineffcient 144

3.4.B.Ⅲ. Performance useless-frustration of purpose 148

3.4.B.Ⅳ. Performance still efficient-adjustment or discharge 150

3.4.B.Ⅴ. Operational issues of adjustment rule-court’s application 153

3.4.B.Ⅵ. Decrease in costs of performance 156

3.4.C. Synthesis: Towards an optimal discharge/adjustment doctrine 157

3.5. French law （revision pur imprevision） 159

3.5.A. General overview 160

3.5.B. Analysis 165

3.5.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 165

3.5.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action 173

3.5.B.Ⅲ. Broad interpretation of impossibility requirement 184

3.5.B.Ⅳ. Purpose frustrated 189

3.5.B.Ⅴ. Strikes constituting force majeure 192

3.5.C. French administrative law 194

3.5.C.Ⅰ. French administrative law- law in action 195

3.5.D. Conclusions on French law 199

3.6. English common law 200

3.6.A. General overview 201

3.6.A.Ⅰ. Short comparative and terminological note 206

3.6.B. Analysis 207

3.6.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 207

3.6.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action 213

3.6.B.Ⅲ. Excessively onerous performance-discharge of contract 214

3.6.B.Ⅳ. Merely more onerous performance-no excuse 218

3.6.B.Ⅴ. Simultaneous substantial increase in cost and in value- performance efficient 225

3.6.B.Ⅵ. Purpose frustrated 229

3.6.C. Conclusions about English law 235

3.7. American law （absolute impossibility, frustration and impracticability） 235

3.7.A. General overview 237

3.7.A.Ⅰ. A brief comparative and terminological note 242

3.7.B. Analysis 243

3.7.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 243

3.7.B.Ⅱ. Well established rules of law - traditional categories of impracticability excuse 253

3.7.B.Ⅲ. Assessment of the law in action 254

3.7.B.Ⅳ. Excessively onerous performance -discharge of contract 254

3.7.B.Ⅴ. Merely more onerous performance -no excuse 263

3.7.B.Ⅵ. Simultaneous substantial increase in costs and value - performance still efficient 266

3.7.B.Ⅶ. Purpose frustrated 269

3.7.C. Conclusions on American law 272

3.8. German law （storung der geschaftsgrundlage） 272

3.8.A. General overview 273

3.8.A.Ⅰ. Short comparative and terminological note 279

3.8.B. Analysis 280

3.8.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 281

3.8.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action 289

3.8.B.Ⅲ. Excessively onerous performance -discharge of contract 290

3.8.B.Ⅳ. Merely more onerous performance -no excuse 294

3.8.B.Ⅴ. Simultaneous substantial increase in costs and value - performance still efficient 297

3.8.B.Ⅵ. Purpose frustrated - generally no excuse 301

3.8.C. Conclusions on German law 306

3.9. Conclusion 307

4. Unilateral Termination 309

4.1. Introduction 309

4.2. Prior literature 311

4.3. Optimal model rule 315

4.3.A. Preliminaries and terminological distinctions 316

4.3.B. Optimal model rule - fundamental principles 317

4.3.C. Unilateral termination of long-term contracts for an indefinite period of time 318

4.3.C.Ⅰ. Optimal risk allocation 322

4.3.C.Ⅱ. Relation-specific investments 323

4.3.C.Ⅲ. Reducing transaction costs 324

4.3.D. Termination upon specific provision 325

4.3.D.Ⅰ. Optimal risk allocation 326

4.3.D.Ⅱ. Relation-specific investment 327

4.3.D.Ⅲ. Reducing transaction costs 328

4.3.E. Termination of fixed-term contracts 328

4.3.E.Ⅰ. Optimal risk allocation 330

4.3.E.Ⅱ. Relation-specific investment 330

4.3.E.Ⅲ. Reducing transaction costs 331

4.3.F. Synthesis: Towards an optimal unilateral termination doctrine 331

4.4. French law （resiliation） 332

4.4.A. General overview 333

4.4.B. Analysis 335

4.4.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 336

4.4.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action 337

4.4.C. Conclusions on French law 340

4.5. English law 341

4.5.A. General overview 341

4.5.B. Analysis 344

4.5.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 344

4.5.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action 347

4.5.C. Conclusions on English law 350

4.6. American law 351

4.6.A. General overview 351

4.6.A.Ⅰ. Terminological note 354

4.6.B. Analysis 354

4.6.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 355

4.6.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action 357

4.6.C. Conclusions on American law 361

4.7. German law 362

4.7.A. General overview 362

4.7.B. Analysis 365

4.7.B.Ⅰ. Assessment of current doctrine 365

4.7.B.Ⅱ. Assessment of the law in action 368

4.7.C. Conclusions on German law 369

4.8. Conclusion 370

5. Summary and Conclusions 373

5.1. Summary on Chapter 2: Pre-contractual duty to disclose information 374

5.2. Summary on Chapter 3: Unforeseen contingencies 374

5.3. Summary on Chapter 4: Unilateral termination 376

5.4. General conclusions 378

5.5. Final remarks 378

Index 381