PATENT POLICY LEGAL-ECONOMIC EFFECTS IN A NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKpdf电子书版本下载

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1 General introduction 5

PART Ⅰ Patent systems and patent law 5

2 Introduction 7

3 A short history of the patent system 8

3.1 A general overview 8

3.1.1 The first patents 9

3.1.2 The guilds in the middle ages 9

3.1.3 The development in the United States 11

3.2 lnternational patent treaties 13

3.2.1 The Paris Convention 13

3.2.2 The TRIPs Agreement 15

3.2.3 The Patent Cooperation Treaty 18

3.A Important development steps of patents 19

4 Foundations of patent systems 22

4.1 Natural rights theory 22

4.1.1 John Locke and the natural rights theory 22

4.1.2 Intellectual property and natural rights 23

4.2 Utilitarian theory 24

4.2.1 Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism 24

4.2.2 Utilitarianism and patent systems 24

4.2.3 Two patent theories 27

5 An introduction to patent law and policy instruments 30

5.1 Thepatentsystem 31

5.1.1 Patent prosecution 31

5.1.2 Patent enforcement 34

5.2 Legal policy instruments and their economic effects 35

5.2.1 Patent prosecution 35

5.2.2 Patent enforcement 43

5.3 From patent law to economic modelling 46

5.A A comparison of patent fees 48

PART Ⅱ Patent policy from a national perspective 49

6 Introduction 51

7 The optimal patent term 53

7.1 Patent maintenance 54

7.2 Nordhaus’model of optimal unoCorm patent lofe 55

7.2.1 Public vs private knowledge as the source for ideas 55

7.2.2 The timing of the decisions 56

7.2.3 The market stage 57

7.2.4 The inventor’s research effort 58

7.2.5 The optimal patent length 60

7.3 Optimal renewal schemes 63

7.3.1 Asymmetric information on the patent value 63

7.3.2 The benchmark models 64

7.3.3 Optimal differentiation policy 67

7.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions 72

8 Patent scope 74

8.1 Exogenous patent value 75

8.1.1 The general framework 75

8.1.2 General results 79

8.1.3 The optimal policy design for horizontal product differentiation 82

8.2 Endogenous patent value 86

8.2.1 A patent race with endogenous research effort 87

8.2.2 The optimal investment decision 89

8.2.3 The socially optimal policy design 90

8.3 Patent scope and costly imitation 92

8.3.1 A model with endogenous research effort and costly imitation 92

8.3.2 The firms’decisions 93

8.3.3 The optimal patent length and patent scope when imitation is costly 96

8.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions 97

9 Patent breadth 100

9.1 A simple model without patent length 101

9.1.1 A sequence of two inventions 101

9.1.2 The optimal patent-anti-trust policy 107

9.2 An infinite sequence of inventions with patent term 112

9.2.1 A sequence of innovations and patent instruments 112

9.2.2 A model of homogeneous tastes 115

9.2.3 Heterogeneous tastes in a model of a natural oligopoly 121

9.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions 127

10 The non-obviousness standard 128

10.1 The basic framework of a model with an infinite sequence of patent races 129

10.1.1 An infinite sequence of patent races 129

10.1.2 Patentability and the non-obviousness standard 130

10.1.3 Demand and prices 132

10.1.4 The expected profits 132

10.2 Firms and the optimal research effort 133

10.2.1 The ex-post value functions 133

10.2.2 The ex-ante value function 136

10.2.3 The optimal research effort 136

10.3 The optimal non-obviousness standard 140

10.3.1 The ex-post version 140

10.3.2 The ex-ante version 142

10.4 The ease of invention 144

10.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions 147

PART Ⅲ Patent policy in an international framework 153

11 Introduction 155

12 New patentable subject matters 157

12.1 A simple model of new patentable subject matters 158

12.1.1 Two firms engaged in a single patent race 158

12.1.2 The domestic firm’s disadvantage 159

12.1.3 The home country’s decision 163

12.1.4 Shortcomings 166

12.2 New patentable subject matters and endogenous research effort 166

12.2.1 Basic assumptions 167

12.2.2 The firms’value functions 169

12.2.3 The firms’optimal choice 173

12.2.4 The effect on firms 178

12.2.5 The home country’s welfare functions 180

12.2.6 Welfare considerations 183

12.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions 183

13 Different non-obviousness standards 188

13.1 The basic framework 188

13.1.1 Patentability and the non-obviousness standard 189

13.1.2 Demand and prices 190

13.1.3 The firms’ position in an ex-post situation 190

13.1.4 The expected profits 191

13.2 Differences in the non-obviousness standard and their effect on firms 193

13.2.1 The value functions 193

13.2.2 The effect of a diverging domestic non-obviousness standard on firms 196

13.3 The optimal non-obviousness standard 198

13.3.1 The general forms of the social welfare functions 198

13.3.2 The society’s unilateral decision 202

13.3.3 Simultaneous decision 205

13.4 Policy implications 206

13.A Proofs to the lemmata and propositions 208

Notes 213

Bibliography 223

Author index 232