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CHAPTER 1．THE THEORY 1

1．1．Introduction 1

1．2．Stimulus-Sampling-Theory of Learning 5

1．3．Simple Example：Markov Model for Noncontingent Case 10

1．4．Markov Model for Zero-Sum，Two-Person Games 23

1．5．Alternative Linear Model 31

1．6．Comparisons with Game Theory 33

1．7．Hypothesis Models 37

1．8．Survey of Recent Literature 42

1．9．Summary 46

CHAPTER 2．METHODS OF ANALYSIS 47

2．1．Introduction 47

2．2．Maximum-Likelihood Estimates 48

2．3．Pseudomaximum-Likelihood Estimates 51

2．4．Some Statistical Tests for Markov Chains 56

2．5．Estimation of Transition Numbers in Multi-Element Models 60

2．6．Generalized Conditioning Model 71

2．7．Summary 77

CHAPTER 3．SOME ZERO-SUM，TWO-PERSON SITUATIONS 78

3．1．Introduction 78

3．2．Experimental Method 81

3．3．Mean Learning Curves and Asymptotic Results 83

3．4．Tests for Markov Properties 87

3．5．Estimate of θ and Predicted Asymptotic Variance 88

3．6．Game-Theory Comparisons 90

3．7．Multi-Element Models 95

3．8．Generalized Conditioning Model 104

3．9．Summary 108

CHAPTER 4．SOME NON-ZERO-SUM，TWO-PERSON SITUATIONS 109

4．1．Introduction 109

4．2．Model 110

4．3．Experimental Method 113

4．4．Mean Learning Curves and Asymptotic Results 114

4．5．Estimates of θA and θB 117

4．6．Tests for Markov Properties 119

4．7．Game-Theory Comparisons 120

4．8．Generalized Conditioning Model 123

4．9．Summary 127

CHAPTER 5．A SYMMETRIC NON-ZERO-SUM SITUATION 128

5．1．Theoretical Description 128

5．2．Experimental Method 129

5．3．Mean Learning Curves 130

5．4．Maximum-Likelihood Estimate of θ and Related Predictions 131

5．5．Tests for Markov Properties 132

5．6．Game-Theory Comparisons 132

5．7．Generalized Conditioning Model 133

5．8．Summary 135

CHAPTER 6．COMMUNICATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN TWO-PERSON SITUATIONS 136

6．1．Introduction 136

6．2．Model 140

6．3．Experimental Method 143

6．4．Mean Learning Curves and Asymptotic Results 145

6．5．Estimate of θ and Predicted Asymptotic Transitions 148

6．6．Game-Theory Comparisons 150

6．7．Summary 152

CHAPTER 7．ANOTHER COMMUNICATION STUDY 153

7．1．Introduction 153

7．2．Model 154

7．3．Experimental Method 157

7．4．Mean Learning Curves and Asymptotic Results 159

7．5．Asymptotic Transition Data 162

7．6．Summary 165

CHAPTER 8．A THREE-PERSON，SIMPLE MAJORITY SITUATION 166

8．1．General Description of the Situation 166

8．2．Model 167

8．3．Experimental Method 172

8．4．Mean Learning Curves and Asymptotic Results 172

8．5．Estimates of θ in Terms of ？(Oi) 175

8．6．Tests for Markov Properties 176

8．7．Maximum-Likelihood Estimate of θ and Predicted Transition Probabilities 176

8．8．Game-Theory Comparisons 178

8．9．Summary 180

CHAPTER 9．DISPLAY OF PAYOFF MATRIX 181

9．1．Theoretical Description 181

9．2．Experimental Method 182

9．3．Tests for Differences Among Experimental Conditions 185

9．4．Mean Learning Curves and Asymptotic Results 186

9．5．Game-Theory Comparisons 189

9．6．Tests for Markov Properties 190

9．7．Generalized Conditioning Model 190

9．8．Summary 193

CHAPTER 10．MONETARY PAYOFFS AND NONCONTINGENT REINFORCEMENT SCHEDULES 194

10．1．Introduction 194

10．2．Experimental Method 196

10．3．Mean Learning Curves and Asymptotic Results 197

10．4．Tests for Markov Properties 199

10．5．Generalized Conditioning Model 200

10．6．Application of the Multi-Element Model 205

10．7．Application of the Linear Model 217

10．8．Application of a Hypothesis Model 222

10．9．A Memory Model 227

10．10．Summary 230

CHAPTER 11．UTILITY FUNCTIONS 232

11．1．Introduction 232

11．2．Model 234

11．3．Experimental Method 237

11．4．Mean Learning Curves and Transition Data 239

11．5．Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of the Conditioning Parameters and Predicted Asymptotes 240

11．6．An Alternative Interpretation of Conditioning 241

11．7．Utility Functions；Luce＇s Multiplication Rule 243

11．8．A Third Interpretation of Conditioning 246

11．9．An Observing-Response Model of Choice Behavior 247

11．10．Brief Account of a Second Experiment 252

11．11．Summary 254

CHAPTER 12．EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 256

12．1．Introduction 256

12．2．Social Conformity 256

12．3．Economic Oligopoly 265

12．4．Continuous Games 271

12．5．Conclusions 278

BIBLIOGRAPHY 285

AUTHOR INDEX 291

SUBJECT INDEX 293